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THREE FRAMINGS OF "FASTER" AT THE FDA AND
THE FEDERAL RIGHT TO TRY

JORDAN PARADISE,J.D.t
I.

INTRODUCTION

In

Try Act
the controversial Right to
2018, Congress
May Act"),
("RTT
creating passed
a process for terminally ill patients to request access to investigational drugs.1 The federal RTT Act is not
the first legal mechanism that fosters quicker access to investigational drugs. 2 This new right to try is distinct from existing pathways
created by law, regulation, or federal administrative agency policy.
Various mechanisms facilitated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") are significantly more substantial and important
in the context of "faster" access to therapeutic products.' These
mechanisms lie along a spectrum of product development spanning
investigational new drug status to postmarket studies and surveillance. I categorize these mechanisms into three areas: expansion,4

t The author would like to thank Pennsylvania State University Law School faculty
for helpful feedback on a draft of this article during participation in a works in progress in
March 2020. The article is the product of a presentation given at Wake Forest University
School of Law's conference entitled Right to Try Laws: The Benefits and Burdens of Balancing
Protectionwith Access in Human Subject Research, held on November 1, 2019.
1.

This article uses the term "drugs" to refer both to pharmaceutical drugs and bio-

logical drugs.
2.

ExpandedAccess to InvestigationalDrugsforTreatment Use- Questions andAnswers, U.S.

FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 1, https://www.fda.gov/media/85675/download

(last updated Oct.

2017).
3.

Janet Woodcock and Peter Marks, DeliveringPromisingNew Medicines Without Sacri-

ficing Safety and Efficacy, U.S.

FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.fda
.gov/news-events/fda-voices/delivering-promising-new-medicines-without-sacrificing-

safety-and-efficacy.
4. Expansion describes a change from something smaller to something larger; here,
both an expansion of access to a larger patient population and an expansion of input from
a larger stakeholder population.
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acceleration,5 and extension.6 The RTT Act is an expansion mechanism, because it expands patient access to investigational new drugs
as an alternative mechanism to the FDA's longstanding expanded
access program. 7 As the Senate noted, the RTT Act "does not establish a new entitlement or modify an existing entitlement, or otherwise establish a positive right." Rather, it "is consistent with and will
act as an alternative pathway alongside existing expanded access
policies of the Food and Drug Administration."8
This article positions the new RTT Act in proper context and
explores additional FDA mechanisms that serve to speed up patient
access. Part I discusses the content and scope of right to try legislation, as well as the reasons in support of and in opposition to the
law. The enacted legislation is only four pages long and introduces
a concise procedure for requests for access to investigational drugs. 9
The article next examines FDA mechanisms for expansion in Part
II, comparing the RTT Act with the current expanded access program at the FDA. Part II explores two mechanisms of expansion at
the FDA: (1) expanded access for patients to investigational drugs
and devices ("expanded access" program) and (2) expanded input
from patients about experiences with drugs and devices under review at the FDA ("patient experience" data). This expansion of patient input was initiated and implemented within the FDA but further directed by provisions within the 21st Century Cures Act.10
Part III analyzes several mechanisms of accelerated review
and approval at the FDA, including Fast Track status, priority review, accelerated approval, Orphan Drug status, and Breakthrough
designation of promising therapeutics. These hastened mecha-

5. Acceleration describes procedures for rapid review and approval of products showing promise to address life-threatening conditions or unmet medical needs.
6. Extension describes an increase in the time period allotted for something; here,
an extension of clinical trial phases into the postmarket timeframe.
7.

See Expanded Access to InvestigationalDrugs for Treatment Use - Questions and Answers,

supra note 2, at 2 (discussing removal of regulations on treatment use and current categories of expanded access).
8.

Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right

to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-176,
amended at 21 U.S.C. 360bbb-0).

§

3(4), 132 Stat. 1372, 1374 (2018) (codified as

9. See generally SUSAN THAUL, CONGR. RES. SERV., R45414, RIGHT TO TRY: ACCESS TO
INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45414
(last

updated Nov. 27, 2018).
10. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, §§ 3001-3004, 130 Stat. 1033, 108385 (2016) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 360bbb-8c).
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nisms of review and approval are poorly understood, leading to confusion and misunderstanding by physicians and patients alike."
They also alter the foundational new drug approval framework originally set forth by Congress in the Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments enacted in 1962, which strengthened the drug approval process to include not only premarket safety review but also a
demonstration of substantial evidence of efficacy through "adequate and well-controlled" clinical trials. 12 Recent empirical scholarship informs this Part, revealing that the growing array of statutory mechanisms to speed up clinical trials, review, and approval are
cutting away at longstanding protections afforded by robust
measures of safety and efficacy. Part IV discusses extension at the
FDA, particularly the extension of evidence gathering in postmarket clinical trials to support showings of safety and efficacy. The article concludes with several reflections on the relationship of the
federal RTT Act to these FDA mechanisms of "faster access," as well
as potential implications of expansion, acceleration, and extension
on patient safety, patent protections, and drug costs.

II.

THE HISTORY AND HYPE OF THE RIGHT TO TRY ACT

The RTT Act, the federal legislation with the empowering
and "crowd-pleasing" title, 13 establishes a procedure by which patients suffering from terminal illness can work with their physician
to request access to pharmaceuticals in early-stage clinical trials.14
The title of the RTT Act is in fact a misnomer, as the legislation
provides merely a right to ask the drug sponsor for permission to
use the drug, rather than a definitive grant of access to it.15 The
concept is not a novel one, as the FDA has a longstanding expanded

11. See ExpandedAccess to InvestigationalDrugsfor Treatment Use - Questions and Answers,
supra note 2, at 2 (describing the FDA's guidance on implementation of the regulation).

12. Drug Amendments Act of 1962, Pub. L. 87-781, 52 Stat. 1049, 1052 (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 301 etseq).
13. ClaudiaWallis, The So-CalledRight to Try Law Gives PatientsFalseHope, SCI.AM.(Sept.
1, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-so-called-right-to-try-law-givespatients-false-hope.
14. See Right To Try, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, https://www.fda.gov/patients/learnabout-expanded-access-and-other-treatment-options/right-try (last updated Jan. 14, 2020).
15.

Roseann B. Termini, The Latest "FederalMovement" in the Food and DrugLaw Arena:

The Federal Right-to-Try or Rather Right-to-Know and Thus Request Investigational Therapiesfor
Individuals with A Life-Threatening Disease or Condition, 16 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 101, 118

(2018).
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access policy and process that accomplishes the same end result,
though in a more public health and safety-focused manner. 16
National coverage of the rights of patients to access investigational drugs has been prominent in the last few years due to several factors, including patient advocacy campaigns through social
media, its portrayal in the critically acclaimed film Dallas Buyers
Club, and widespread enactment of state right to try bills.17 The outcomes of two legal cases have also shaped the debate in this area.
Nearly a decade ago, in Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach, the D.C.
Circuit held that terminally ill patients had no fundamental right to
experimental therapy that had not yet received approval by the
FDA.18 Abigail Alliance had petitioned the FDA to promulgate new
regulations allowing drug sponsors to market investigational new
drugs to terminally ill patients once the drugs had completed Phase
1 safety trials.19 After the FDA denied the petition, Abigail Alliance
filed a lawsuit alleging violation of a constitutionally protected
right. 20 This outcome followed a previous Supreme Court case, U.S.
v. Rutherford, where the Court held that there was no special right
for terminally ill patients to access a drug that was subject to a pending new drug application where safety and efficacy had not yet been

established by the FDA.21
The RTT Act, signed into law in May 2018, follows legislation
in 41 states that provided a mechanism to request access to investigational drugs. 22 A brainchild of the Goldwater Institute, state right
to try legislation emphasized patient autonomy and liberty in making choices about treatment options in the face of life-threatening
disease. 23 Supporters of the RTT Act argue that the federal legislation removes unnecessary barriers caused by regulation, ensures
timely access, reduces inequalities for individuals not able to travel

16.

Id. at 113-16 (discussing FDA action prior to the RTT Act).

17.

Sam Adriance, Fightingfor the "Right To Try" UnapprovedDrugs: Law as Persuasion,

124 YALE L. J. FORUM, 148, 148-151 (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/right-to-try-unapproved-drugs.
18. Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The FDA
subsequently revised regulations to allow requests for access to investigational drugs follow-

ing completion of Phase 1 clinical trials in 2009. 21 C.F.R.
19. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 699.
20. Id. at 700.
21. U.S. v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553 (1979).
22. Termini, supra note 15, at 102-03.

§ 312

(2009).

23. Jacqueline Howard, What You Need to Know About the Right To Try Legislation, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/22/health/federal-right-to-try-explainer/index.html (last

.

updated May 29, 2018, 1:50 PM),
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abroad to access the drug in another country, and offers hope to
terminally ill patients.2
Colorado enacted the first state right to try law in May
2014.25 While state right to try laws vary, the key requirements are
largely consistent: the patient must have a terminal diagnosis; the
drug requested must have passed Phase 1 clinical trial safety testing;
the healthcare provider must recommend the drug based on their
medical opinion of the patient; and the patient must give informed
consent.26 The federal legislation likely impliedly preempts these
state laws despite no express preemption provision within the statute.27
The RTT Act is a short piece of legislation consisting of one
substantive section that amends the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
by adding a new Section 561B followed by a "Sense of the Senate"
section. 28 The legislation provides "eligible patients" with a "lifethreatening disease or condition" who have "exhausted all approved treatment options" and are "unable to participate in a clinical trial involving the investigational drug" with the ability to request access from the drug sponsor. 29 The request must be certified
by a physician in good standing and who may not be compensated
for that certification. 30 The patient must provide written informed
consent, though the process is not subject to FDA informed consent
requirements. 31

24. D. Carrieri et al., The Ethical Plausibility of the "Right To Try" Laws, 122 CLIN. REV.
ONCOLOGY 64, 66 (2018). "Hope is a powerful drug." M.E. Blair Holbein et al., Right Now,
In the Right Way: US. Food andDrugAdministrations'Expanded
Access ProgramandPatientRights,

2 J. CLIN. & TRANSL. SC. 115, 117 (2018).
25. D. Carrieri et al., The Ethical Plausibility of the "Right To Try" Laws, 122 CLIN. REV.
ONCOLOGY 64, 64 (2018).
26. Id.
27.

Mark Borreliz et al., Federal Right to Try ": Don't Disregard Your State Laws Yet!, JD

SUPRA (June 13, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/federal-right-to-try-don-t-dis-

regard-90983.
28.

See Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina

Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-176, § 3(4), 132 Stat. 1372, 1374 (2018) (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. 360bbb-0) §§ 2(a), 3. A prior piece of legislation, the 21st Century
Cures Act, contained provisions requiring drug manufacturers and distributors to make
public their expanded access policies, otherwise termed compassionate use, for investigational drugs undergoing clinical trials. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255,

130 Stat.
29.
30.
31.

1033, 1100-01 (2016) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-Oa(a)(1)(A)-(B).
21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-Oa(a)(1)(B).
21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-Oa(a)(1)(C).

§ 360bbb).

§

3032,
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Under the RTT Act, an "eligible investigational drug" is a
drug for which Phase 1 clinical trials have been completed, no existing approval or license exists, and an application has been filed
or is under investigation in a trial to support a claim of effectiveness.
Further, these drugs are subject to an active investigational new
drug ("IND") and must not be discontinued by the manufacturer.32
Investigational drugs subject to a clinical hold imposed by the FDA
are not eligible. 33 These provisions make clear that the RTT Act is
applicable to both drugs and biologics but not medical devices. 34
Such eligible investigational drugs are exempt from select misbranding and new drug approval requirements, provided they comply with regulations pertaining to investigational drugs. 35
If a sponsor or individual who "manufactures, distributes,
prescribes, or dispenses" a drug introduces or delivers that drug for
introduction into interstate commerce, or provides an eligible investigational drug," then that entity or person can charge for direct
costs of the particular drug, including costs to manufacture, acquire, and ship and handle. 36 The drug is exempt from labeling for
adequate directions for use, 37 but is subject to labeling for INDs 38
and promotion of INDs. 39 The sponsor, manufacturer, prescriber,
dispenser, or other individual entity is also exempt from liability
with respect to acts or omissions under the RTT Act unless it engages in "reckless or willful misconduct, gross negligence, or an intentional tort."' The RTT Act does expressly provide that private
actions under state product liability, tort, consumer protection law,
and warranty law are not impacted.4 1

§ 360bbb-Oa(a)

32.

21 U.S.C.

33.

See Right to Try, supra note 14.

(2).

34.

The RTT Act references both 21 U.S.C.

§

355 (pertaining to new drugs) and the

Public Health Service Act, 21 U.S.C. § 351 (pertaining to biologics). 21 U.S.C. § 360bbbOa(a) (2)(C).
35. Specifically, 21 U.S.C §§ 352(f), 353(b) (4), 355(a), and 355(i). 21 U.S.C. § 360bbbOa(b) (2018).
36. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-Oa(b) (referencing 21 CFR §§312.6-8(d)(1)).
37. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-Oa(b) (referencing 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)).
38. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-Oa(b) (referencing 21 CFR § 312.6).
39. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-Oa(b) (referencing 21 CFR § 312.7).
40. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-Oa(b) (1)(B).
41.

See Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina

Right to TryAct of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-176,
as amended at 21 U.S.C. 360bbb-0).

§ 3(4),

132 Stat. 1372, 1374 (2018) (codified
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While the RTT Act excludes the FDA from the process, expressly creating an "alternative pathway"4 2 for patients, several sections of the RTT Act reference the FDA. 43 Congress prohibits the
FDA from using any clinical outcome to delay or adversely affect
review or approval unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services makes a determination that use is critical to establishing the
safety of the drug or the sponsor requests the use of such outcomes.44 As described by the FDA, the limited role of the agency in
the right to try process is "receipt and posting of certain information submitted regarding Right to Try use."4 5 Annual reporting
of any use of the drug, including doses supplied, number of patients
treated, uses for which the drug is made available, and any known
serious adverse events is to be posted on the FDA website. The
agency states on its website that it "will post a consolidated annual
summary report of Right to Try Act use." 47 As of July 2020, such a
report is not yet available on the FDA's website.

The RTT Act has been widely criticized by bioethicists, patient groups, physicians, lawyers, and scientists for several significant reasons.48 At a very basic level, critics argue that it gives patients

42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. § 2-3.
21 U.S.C.

45.

See Right to Try, supra note 14.

46.

21 U.S.C.

47.

See Right to Try, supra note 14.

48.

See, e.g., D. Carrieri, F.A. Peccatori, and G. Boniolo, The Ethical Plausibility of the

§ 360bbb-Oa(c)(1).
§ 360bbb-0a(d)

(2).

"Right To Try" Laws, 122 CLIN. REV. ONCOLOGY 64, 66 (2018) (citing M.J. Rubin ad K.R.
Matthews, The Impact of Right to Try Laws on Medical Access in the United States, 66 THE BAKER
INST. POL'Y REP. 1, 8-10 (2016)); Nicole Karlis, PatientAdvocacy Groups Scratch Their Heads
Over Trump's Right to Try Act, SALON (June 1, 2018, 5:22 PM), https://www.sa-

lon.com/2018/06/01/patient-advocacy-groups-scratch-their-heads-over-trumps-right-totry-act (characterizing advocacy groups as perplexed by the bill and at Trump's statement
that it will save hundreds of thousands of lives); Rachel Roubein, 40 PatientAdvocacy Groups

Oppose Right to Try Drug Bill, THE HILL (Feb. 6, 2018, 4:07 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/372600-40-patient-advocacy-groups-oppose-right-to-try-drug-bill
(discussing
letter to House from 40 patient advocacy groups who say the bill would "likely do more
harm than good"); Michael D. Becker, I'm the Ideal Person to Support the Right to Try. But I
Can't - It's a Disaster in the Making, STATNEwS (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2018/02/01/right-to-try-cancer-fda (highlighting a terminally ill patient perspective that RTT would "make things worse" focusing on costs and impact on insurance
and hospice coverage); James Hamblin, The Disingenuousnessof"Right to Try", THE ATLANTIC
(June
2,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/06/right-totry/561770; David Gorski, Right to Try is Now Law. Let PatientsBeware!, SCIENCE-BASED MED.
(Jun. 4, 2018), https://sciencebasedmedicine.org/right-to-try-is-now-law-let-patients-beware; Holly Fernandez Lynch et al., PromotingPatientInterests in Implementing the FederalRight
to Try Act, 320 JAMA 869, 869-70 (2018). However, despite intense opposition, there was
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false hope. 49 Even the name itself implies that it grants an affirmative right rather than the mere option and process to officially request treatment. The legislation does not compel drug sponsors to
acquiesce.5 0 More significantly, the right to try process does not involve the oversight and active involvement of the FDA, which could
harm patients.51 Major patient advocacy groups argue that the current expanded access mechanisms are effective in providing critically ill patients a safe method of receiving unapproved therapies
and that removing FDA oversight poses the same dangers that FDA
law has evolved to counteract.52 Patient advocacy groups also cite
ethical concerns with the inability to provide patients seeking access
to unapproved therapies the same protections that patients in clinical trials are afforded. 53
Likewise, physicians have also expressed concern with the
bill's removal of FDA oversight, urging that removal of FDA oversight could allow patients to become "victims to the likes of snake
oil salesmen offering 'treatments' that could kill rather than
cure."5 Doctors urge that the elimination of the FDA from the process effectively removes the mechanism by which the success of
treatments is monitored, weakening the role of the agency and compromising both patient safety and the public trust.55 Physicians who
are familiar with the FDA's expanded access policies emphasize that
the RTT Act is redundant as it is not the FDA that obstructs patient
access to unapproved treatments, but rather drug developers and
manufacturers. 56 Legal commentators similarly criticize the RTT

some patient advocacy support for the bill. See, e.g., Larry Luxner, Rare Disease Groups, Pa-

tients Differ on Right to Try Bill Before US. Congress, ALS NEWS TODAY (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://alsnewstoday.com/2018/02/12/rare-disease-groups-patients-differ-on-right-to-trybill-before-us-congress.
49.

Wallis, supra note 13.

50.

Id.

51.

Right to Try Coalition Letter to Speaker of the House Paul Ryan and Minority

Leader Nancy Pelosi (Feb. 6, 2018) ("Both [S.204 and H.R.878] remove the Federal Drug
Administration from the initial approval process for accessing an investigational therapy
outside of a clinical trial.") (on file with the International Society for Stem Cell Research)
[hereinafter Right to Try CoalitionLetter].

52.
53.

Id.
Id.

54.

Alexandra Sifferlin, The Right-To-Try'Bill has Passed Congress. Here's Why Doctors are

Concerned, TIME (Feb. 5, 2018, 2:15 PM), https://ime.com/5132892/right-to-try-bill-terminal-illness.
55. Id.; see also Right to Try Coalition Letter, supra note 51.
56. See Right to Try Coalition Letter, supra note 51 ("When access to a therapy is denied to a patient, it is generally the company that denies the request...").
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Act for removing informed consent and Institutional Review Board
("IRB") protections, failing to restrict costs and provide mechanisms or incentives for insurance coverage, and eliminating FDAgranted incentives to provide investigational drugs, among other
things.5 7
Practically speaking, it is also unclear whether pharmaceutical sponsors will even utilize the RTT Act or whether they will instead continue to coordinate with the FDA's expanded access program. With recent streamlining of FDA procedures, drug sponsors
report satisfaction with the FDA's mechanisms. 58 The RTT Act does
not remedy the reputational fallout resulting from incidents involving investigational drugs, 59 and the industry may be more inclined
to involve the FDA. There is a dearth of information available about
instances in which the new RTT Act route has been successful absent the creation of the annual reports by the FDA.60 An academic
medical oncology online resource noted in October 2019 that two
patients have secured access to an investigational drug using the
RTT Act process: one for brain cancer and the other for amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. 61
III.

EXPANSION OF PATIENT ACCESS AND PATIENT INPUT

The right to try involves a theoretical expansion of access for
terminally ill patients to investigational new drugs that bypasses existing FDA expanded access polices and mechanisms. 62 With recent
legislative changes in the 21st Century Cures Act, there are also new
provisions involving an expansion in patient input to FDA decisionmaking processes. 63 Therefore, there are two forms of expansion at

57.

See, e.g., Holly Fernandez Lynch et al., PromotingPatientInterests in Implementing the

Federal Right to Try Ac 320 JAMA 869, 869-70 (2018); Alison Bateman-House and Christopher T. Robertson, The FederalRight to Try Act of 2017 -A

tionalDrugs and the Path Forward, 178 JAMA INTERNAL

Wrong Turn for Access to Investiga-

MED. 321, 321-22 (2018).

58. Brandon Brown et al., Assessment of the Right-to-Try Law: The Pros and the Cons,
OF NUCLEAR MED. 1492, 1492 (2018).

59J.

59.

See Wallis, supra note 13.

60.

See Right to Try Is Working, RIGHT TO TRY, https://righttotry.org/right-to-try-is-

working (last visited June 8, 2020) (note there are few success stories uploaded).
61.

Perelman Sch. of Med. at the Univ. of Pa., How Oncologists Can Ethically Navigate the

"Right to Try" Law, MEDICAL XPRESS (Oct. 22, 2019), https://medicalxpress.com/news
/2019-10-oncologists-ethically-right-to-try-drug-law.html.
62.

Wallis, supra note 13.

63.

See Kyle T. Edwards, Good and Bad PatientInvolvement: Implementing the Patient-In-

volvement Provisionsof the 21st Century Cures Act at the IDA, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 1077, 1086
(2019).

62
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the FDA regarding investigational new products: expanded access
for patients to investigational drugs and devices through the expanded access program and expanded input from patients about
drug and device products under review at the FDA.
A. Expanded PatientAccess to InvestigationalProducts
Expanded access requests, sometimes referred to as "compassionate use" requests, are routinely channeled through the
FDA's Expanded Access Program, which provides access to INDs in
certain circumstances. 64 Codified in 1987, the expanded access program has been adjusted over time to streamline the process and increase transparency in agency decisions. The expanded access assessments focus on whether and to what extent individuals facing
serious or life-threatening diseases or disorders should be able to
access experimental drug treatments that have not yet received FDA
approval under the touchstone measures of safety and effectiveness.
uiThe federal statute provides for such access to INDs, which is further set forth in FDA regulations. 65 In October 2017, the FDA published guidance for the industry titled Individual PatientExpanded
Use Access Applications:Form FDA 3926. This guidance introduced a
more streamlined process for physician submissions of individual
patient requests for compassionate use of experimental drugs undergoing active clinical trials6 6 by building on a well-established system of assessment by the FDA, providing a specific format for submission, and reducing the associated paperwork to two pages.6 7
As the 2017 guidance states, under the applicable criteria in
the regulations,6 8 the FDA must evaluate several key aspects. First,
the FDA must determine that the patient has a serious or immediately life-threatening disease or condition and that there is no comparable or satisfactory alternative therapy to diagnose, monitor, or
treat the disease or condition. 69 Second, the FDA must determine

64. Expanded Access, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/news-events/
public-health-focus/expanded-access (last updated Apr. 27, 2020).
65. 21 C.F.R. § 312.1 ("This part contains procedures and requirements governing the
use of investigational new drugs ... ").
66. GuidanceforIndustry:IndividualPatientExpandedAccess Applications:Form IDA 3926,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 2016), https://www.fda.gov/media/91160/download
[hereinafter FormIDA 3926].

67.
68.
69.

Id.
21 C.F.R.
21 C.F.R.

§§ 312.305(a), 312.310(a).
§ 321.305(a) (1).
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that the patient cannot obtain the investigational drug under another IND or protocol. 70 Third, the FDA must determine that the
potential patient benefit justifies the potential risks of the treatment's use and that those potential risks are not unreasonable in
the context of the disease or condition to be treated.7 1 The FDA
must also determine that providing the investigational drug for the
requested use will not interfere with the initiation, conduct, or completion of clinical investigations that could support marketing approval of the expanded access use or otherwise compromise the potential development of the expanded access use.72 Further, the
treating physician must determine that the probable risk of the investigational drug to the patient is not greater than the probable
risk from the disease or condition.73
The goal of the recent draft guidance process and accompanying form is to make the submission process easier on physicians
requesting access for patients. 74 The FDA's draft guidance document provides that the physician must first confirm that the manufacturer is willing to supply the drug. 7 The physician must include
a letter of authorization ("LOA") in the request which then allows
right of reference to information submitted to the FDA by the drug
sponsor. 76 Contents of a request include patient initials, date of submission, clinical information, patient treatment information, the
LOA from the drug manufacturer, a physician's qualification statement and information such as name, address, contact information,
as well as a request for authorization to use Form FDA 3926, and a
certification statement and signature.7 7 The physician is then considered a sponsor-investigator and subject to human subject protections contained in 21 C.F.R. 50 and IRB requirements in 21 C.F.R.
56.78 Both informed consent and IRB authorization must be obtained prior to initiation unless the request is for an emergency individual use. 79 Treatment with the IND may proceed once the FDA
notifies the physician, or within thirty days after the FDA receives

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 321.310(a) (2).
21 C.F.R. § 321.305(a) (2).
21 C.F.R. § 321.305(a) (3).
21 C.F.R. § 312.310(a) (1).
See Form FDA 3926, at 1-3.
Id. at 5.
Id.
21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(1).
Form FDA 3926, at 5-6.
Id. at 6.

64
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the completed draft form (once finalized by the FDA).`8 The draft
guidance includes a draft Form 3926 as Appendix I.81
The recent changes have undoubtedly improved the expanded access program, as the procedure has long been fraught
with complaints about process, transparency, and outcomes. Complaints include extensive preparation time for physicians, lengthy
FDA review times, a lack of reporting on drug sponsor determinations, uncertainty on coverage for the drugs, effect on clinical trial
enrollment, and liability issues.8 2 Despite these complaints, the FDA
approves over 99% of more than one thousand requests per year. 83
The FDA reports on expanded access requests on its website. 84 However, even if an access request is granted by the FDA, neither the
statute nor the regulations mandate that the drug sponsor provide
the investigational drug.85 Of note, not a single product liability case
has resulted from provision of access to an investigational product
through the FDA's expanded access program. 86

B. Reconciling the Right to Try with the FDA's
Expanded Access Program
The RTT Act intentionally establishes a system that bypasses
historical mechanisms of patient access to investigational products
through the FDA's expanded access program. Ultimately, the RTT
Act will likely have little or no impact on patient access to investigational drugs because it does not disturb the existing expanded access program; it only creates an alternative pathway. There are also
early indications that the pharmaceutical industry is reluctant to
provide access through the RTT Act process rather than the established expanded access program. There are also several significant
problems that the RTT Act pathway introduces.
First, the RTT Act eliminates the FDA from the process, relegating their role to one of merely publishing annual reported data

80.

Id. at 6-7.

81.

Id. at 6 ("Form FDA 3926 ...

may be found on FDA's website at https://www.fda.

gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Forms/default.htm.").
82.

SeeJonathanJ. Darrow et al., Practical,Legal, and EthicalIssues in ExpandedAccess to

InvestigationalDrugs, 372 NEW. ENG.J. MED. 279, 282, 284 (2015).
83.

Bateman-House & Robertson, supra note 57, at 321; Holbein et al., supra note 24,

at 115.
84.

See ExpandedAccess, supranote 64.

85. M.E. Blair Holbein et al., Access to InvestigationalDrugs: IDA Expanded Access Programs or "Right-to-Tiy"Legislation?,8J. CLINICAL & TRANSLATIONAL So. 526, 526 (2015).
86.

Lynch et al., supra note 57, at 870.
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on use of the RTT Act pathway submitted by industry. 87 While the
RTT Act requires informed consent, nowhere does it define and
describe the process; it is not robust "informed consent" as required
by FDA regulations, which mandates IRB approval and express requirements as contained in the Code of Federal Regulations. 88
Stripping away long-established informed consent threatens patient
safety and transparency. It also significantly reduces the quality and
amount of information given to patients.
Second, and relatedly, without the FDA involved, there are
no requirements for rigorous analysis and reporting of clinical outcomes from use of investigational drugs. 89 In fact, the RTT Act prohibits the FDA from using clinical data derived from right to try uses
as part of review and approval of products. 90 The FDA currently
holds the position that it maintains the ability to institute clinical
holds on an investigational product in the face of clinical data,
which then would cause the drug to be outside the scope of the
right to try definition, halting a patient's ability to maintain access. 91
It remains to be seen whether courts will agree with the FDA on this
position based on Congressional intent and the statutory language.
One scholar offers that "because of the requisite confidentiality in
the drug development process, the FDA is often the only repository
of detailed information about a test outside the manufacturer." 92 A
failure to integrate important outcome data, including adverse
events, into product review seriously compromises patient safety.
Third, language in the RTT Act allows the manufacturer or
distributor of the investigational drug to charge for the product,
thereby opening the floodgates to exorbitant costs for hopeful patients. 93 The RTT Act lacks any insurance coverage provisions, forcing patients to pay out of pocket for both the drug itself and for
costs, including travel and accommodations during treatments, as

87.

Holbein et al., supra note 85, at 526.

88.

SeeJennifer Piel, Informed Consent in Right-To-Try Cases, 44J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY

L. 290, 295 (2016).
89. Gail A. Van Norman, ExpandingPatient Access to InvestigationalDrug Single Patient
InvestigationalNewDrugand the "Rightto Try", 3J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY: BASIC TRANSLATIONAL

SC. 280, 290 (2018).
90.

Steven Joffe & Holly Fernandez Lynch, Federal-Right-to-TryLegislation-Threaten-

ing the FDA's Public Health Mission, 378 NEW ENG.J. MED. 695, 696 (2018).
91. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(3).
92. M.E. Blair Holbein et al, Right Now, In the Right Way: US. Food andDrugAdministrations'ExpandedAccess Program and PatientRights, 2J. CLIN. & TRANSL. SCI. 115, 115 (2018).
93.

Bateman-House & Robertson, supra note 57, at 321.
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well as any follow-up medical care. 94 The language allowing for the
collection of direct costs has the potential to create a hefty price tag
for the access alone. 95 The expanded access program requires the
manufacturer to acquire authorization from the FDA to charge the
patient; the FDA will authorize billing when the sponsor demonstrates that it could not conduct the clinical trial without charging
for the drug because of extraordinary cost to that sponsor. 96
Fourth, the liability exemptions will likely not be enough to
sway sponsors to utilize that route to provide access to patients. Under both the FDA's expanded access program and RTT Act, a manufacturer is not mandated to provide access to the product, and
many, if not most, will refuse access to avoid liability entirely. 9 The
right to try exemption from liability is not unlimited; there may still
be a cause of action for reckless or willful misconduct, gross negligence, or intentional tort. 98 The RTT Act also expressly states that
private actions under state product liability, tort, consumer protection, and warranty laws are not impacted by the exemption from
liability. 99 This language will likely be tested by the courts if a relevant scenario arises, given the almost complete lack of safety tracking, deep analysis of adverse events information, and patient protection. The industry will likely adhere to a "devil that you know"
position, continuing to work with the FDA through the expanded
access program and well-established mechanisms.
C. Expanded PatientInput
The FDA has a history of involving patients in the regulatory
process, beginning in the late 1980s with the creation of HIV/AIDs
patient groups and the subsequent inclusion of patient representatives on advisory committees in 1991.100 Patient input initiatives

94.

Holbein et al., supra note 85, at 526.

95. Kelly Folkers et al., Federal Right to Try: Where Is It Going?, 49 HASTINGS CTR. REP.
26, 27-8 (2019).
96. ChargingforInvestigationalDrugs Under an IND - Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/media/85682/download (last visited June 8, 2020);

21 C.F.R.
97.

§

312.8(b)(1)(iii).

Holbein et al., supra note 85, at 526; see also Right to Try Coalition Letter, supra

note 51.
98. See Pub. L. 115-176,
U.S.C. 360bbb-0a).
99. Id.

§

2(b), 132 Stat. 1374 (2018) (codified as amended at 21

100. Evolution of Patient Engagement at IDA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/patients/learn-about-fda-patient-engagement/evolution-patient-engagement-fda-text-description (last updated Apr. 23, 2019).
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have developed concurrently with increasing patient advocacy representation in the form of patient advocacy groups and alliances.
Figure 1 illustrates FDA activity engaging patients.
Figure 1101
Evolution of Patient Engagement at FDA
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The FDA recently noted:
Patient groups have evolved from patient support, advocacy and basic disease research funding organizations, to being more active in medical product development and assessment.
Patients are committed to contributing their
views, data, and resources to increase patientcentric medical product innovation, assessment,
and regulatory decision-making, and we are
committed to assuring that our decisions and actions are informed by patient perspectives. 102
Most recently, the 21st Century Cures Act introduced additional directives to the FDA to facilitate patient engagement in the

101. Learn About FDA Patient Engagement, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
(last updated May 8, 2019).
www.fda.gov/ptpatient-engagement
102.

CTR. FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2016-

2017 STRATEGIC PRIORITIES 7.
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drug and device approval process.103 These provisions serve to move
"engagement" into the regulatory process in several ways. Various
sources trace the close involvement and support of patient advocacy
groups with the pharmaceutical industry in the 21st Century Cures
Act's ultimate success.10 4 Figure 2 identifies several select sections of
the legislation that task the FDA with taking affirmative actions both
to bolster patient input as part of the regulatory process itself and
to speed the review and market entry of promising products.
-e 2: 21st Century Cures Act Provisions10 5

103.

FDA SCI. BD., PROPOSED FDA WORK PLAN FOR 21Z CENTURY CURES ACT

INNOVATION ACCOUNT ACTIVITIES (2017).
104. See, e.g., Sy Mukherjee, Everything You Need to Know About the Massive Health Reorm
Law that Just Passed Congress, FORTUNE (Dec. 7, 2016), https://fortune.com/2016
/12/07/congress-passes-21st-century-cures
[hereinafter Everything You Need to Know About
the Massive Health Reform Law thatJust Passed Congress].

105. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, §§ 3001-3004, 3011, 3021-22, 3024,
3031, 3051, 3053, 3058, 130 Stat. 1033, 1083-91, 1095-1100, 1126-1126, 1128-1129 (2016)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 360bbb).
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Taken together, these provisions expand the scope of information and stakeholders involved in drug review and approval. 10 6
The legislation requires the FDA to include patient experience data
along with review of a sponsor application for approval. 10 7 This patient experience data is considered data collected by any person
that is "intended to provide information about patients' experience
with a disease or conditions."10 8 This includes the impact of the disease or condition, or the accompanying therapy, and preferences
regarding treatment. 109 The law also directs the FDA to issue guidance within eighteen months of enactment on methods to collect
such information from patients and on use of such information in
drug development." The FDA must also publish a report on
agency review of patient experience data and use in regulatory decision-making." Many question how the agency will integrate patient experience data into product information that is circulated to
consumers and health care professionals; some urge that it will require a separate label to facilitate consumer comprehension of the
information.11 2
Congress also requires the FDA to establish a system of qualification for drug development tools, where qualification assures
that the tool "can be relied upon to have a specific interpretation

106.

Discussion of these provisions is adapted fromJordan Paradise, 21" Century Citizen

Pharma, 44 AM.J. L. & MED. 309, 321-23 (2018).
107. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3001(b), 130 Stat. 1033, 1084
(2016) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 360bbb-8c). Patient experience data is defined as
data that is "collected by any persons (including patients, family members and caregivers of
patients, patient advocacy organizations, disease research foundations, researchers, and
drug manufacturers)" and "intended to provide information about patients' experience
with a disease or condition, including (A) the impact of such disease or condition, or a
related therapy, on patients' lives; and (B) patient preferences with respect to treatment of
such disease or condition." Id.

§ 3001(c),

130 Stat. at 1084.

108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. § 3001(c) (2).
Id.
Id. § 3002(a)-(b).
Id. § 3004.

112.

Sue Sutter, PatientExperienceDataMay Require SeparateLabel, Genentech Suggests, PINK

SHEET

10

(Sept.

25,

2017),

https://pink.pharmaintelligence.in-

forma.com/PS122249/Patient-Experience-Data-Section-Added-To-US-FDA-Drug-Reviews.
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and application in drug development and regulatory review." 113
Congress urges the FDA to prioritize the qualification of drug development tools based on considerations of severity, rarity, or prevalence of the disease as well as public health priorities.1 1 4 The law
contemplates that the process involves a letter of intent, qualification plan, and full qualification package for FDA review." 5 Specific
provisions direct the FDA to implement such a qualification process, along with expert consultation, for biomarkers.1 16 A biomarker
is defined as "a characteristic (such as a physiologic, pathologic, or
anatomic characteristic or measurement) that is objectively measured and evaluated as an indicator of normal biologic processes,
pathologic processes, or biological responses to a therapeutic intervention.""7 Legal experts implore the FDA to fully utilize expert
consultants in review of biomarker qualification requests, similar to
advisory committees for substantive products.1
Furthermore, the FDA is tasked with establishment of a program to utilize real world evidence in the assessment of new drug
indications and postmarket approval studies. 119 Congress defines
real world evidence as "data regarding the usage, or the potential
benefits or risks, of a drug derived from sources other than randomized clinical trials."12 0 The FDA is given two years to establish a draft
framework for such a program and begin implementation. 12 1 Congress enumerates required framework contents, which include
sources of real world evidence (such as "ongoing safety surveillance,
observational studies, registries, claims, and patient-centered outcomes research activities"), gaps in data collection, standards and
methodologies for collection of real world evidence, and priority
areas. 122 In implementing the program, the FDA must consult with
several entities, including regulated industry, medical professional

113. Qualification Processfor DrugDevelopment Tools: Guidancefor Industry and FDA Staff;
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/133511/download.
114. 21 U.S.C. § 357(a) (2) (C).
115. Id. § 357(a)(1).
116. Id. § 357(a).
117. Id. § 357(e)(1).
118. See David E. Paul & Catherine Clements, Getting by With A Little Help from Their
Friends: FDA Using External Experts to Enhance Biomarker Qualification and Enhance Precision

Medicine, 72 FooD & DRUG L.J. 660, 661 (2017).
119. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 3 55g (2016).
120. Id. § 355g(b).
121. Id. § 355g(c)(1).
122. Id. § 355g(c)(2).
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organizations, academia, patient advocacy organizations, consumer
organizations, and disease research foundations. 123
Finally, the legislation creates a breakthrough medical device category that accelerates device review and approval. 124 These
provisions mimic the breakthrough therapy designation introduced
in the Food and Drug Administration Safety Innovation Act of 2012

("FDASIA") applying to drugs and biologics.12 ' FDASIA established
an expedited review mechanism and mandatory time frames for
FDA response to applicant requests for breakthrough therapy des-

ignation; the FDA published a guidance for industry in May 2014
detailing the process. 126 Several long-standing FDA policies likewise
support accelerated timeframes for drug products, including Fast
Track designation, accelerated approval, and priority review designation. 12 7 The provisions in the 21st Century Cures Act pertaining
to medical devices similarly set forth a process for breakthrough status for medical devices. 128 The FDA had previously developed an

§
§

123.
124.

Id.
Id.

355g(c)(3).
360e-3.

125.

See Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012 (FDASIA),

Pub. L. No. 112-144,

§ 902,

126 Stat. 993, 1086-1087 (2012) (codified as amended at 21

U.S.C § 356). Breakthrough therapy status signals that the drug is progressing through clinical trials subject to the statutory provisions provided for breakthrough therapies, not that

the drug has been approved by the FDA. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HEALTH & HUMAN
SERV., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS - DRUGS
AND BIOLOGICS 10 (2014) [hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: EXPEDITED PROGRAMS],
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/

Guidances/UCM358301.pdf. The FDA defines a breakthrough therapy as a drug "intended
alone or in combination with one or more other drugs to treat a serious or life threatening
disease or condition and preliminary clinical evidence indicates that the drug may demonstrate substantial improvement over existing therapies on one or more clinically significant
endpoints, such as substantial treatment effects observed early in clinical development." See

Fact Sheet: Breakthrough Therapies, U.S. FOOD

& DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 28, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/Regulatorylnformation/LawsEnforcedbyFDA/SignificantAmendmentstotheFDCAct/FDASIA/ucm329491.htm.
126.

Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act § 902(a); GUIDANCE FOR

INDUSTRY: EXPEDITED PROGRAMS 10-15, supra note 125.
127. See GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: EXPEDITED PROGRAMS, supra note 125, at 1, 7-8. A
table within the FDA's breakthrough therapy guidance document compares the four expedited mechanisms. Id.
128.

See 21 U.S.C.

§ 360e-3.

Congress directs the FDA to focus breakthrough status on

medical devices "that provide for more effective treatment or diagnosis of life-threatening
or irreversibly debilitating human disease or conditions . . . that represent breakthrough
technologies ... for which no approved or cleared alternatives exist ... that offer significant
advantages over existing approved or cleared alternatives, including the potential, compared to existing approved alternatives, to reduce or eliminate the need for hospitalization,
improve patient quality of life, facilitate patients' ability to manage their own care (such as
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Innovation Pathway, piloted in 2011, an expedited access pathway
in 2015, and a Priority Review program as a means to facilitate faster
development and review of promising medical devices. 12 The FDA
implementation activity is set forth in Figure 3.
Figure 3: FDA Imolementation of Recuired Guidance1

30

through self-directed personal assistance), or establish longterm clinical efficiencies; or ...
the availability of which is in the best interest of patients." Id.
129.

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., BREAKTHROUGH DEVICES

PROGRAM: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 1-2
(2018),
https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/
breakthrough-devices-program.
130. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., PLAN FOR ISSUANCE OF
PATIENT-FOCUSED DRUG DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES UNDER 21T CENTURY CARES ACT at 8

(May 2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/105979/download.
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The 21st Century Cures Act, along with FDA efforts, have
affirmatively invited patient voices into the regulatory process. It remains to be seen how this process will be implemented, and how
the agency will respond to increasing patient perspectives and patient-generated information in contrast to long-standing requirements for product approval. There are also critical questions regarding relationships between patient advocacy groups and the
regulated industry, with many drug companies actively funding
these groups or partnering with them on research initiatives. The
Kaiser Health Network recently published a report detailing relationships among patient advocacy groups and the pharmaceutical
industry. 131 Notably, pharmaceutical industry donations to patient
advocacy groups are not subject to Sunshine laws. There is concern
about a perceived lack of attention from patient advocacy groups
on combating high drug costs, which may be the result of close financial ties with the industry. 132 Some commentators also warn that
advocacy groups may exert pressure on the FDA to accelerate access
with less data on safety and efficacy prior to market, straying from
traditional clinical trial models. 133

131. Emily Kopp et al., Pre$criptionfr Power, KAISER HEALTH NEWS, https://khn.org
/patient-advocacy/# (last visited Mar. 6, 2020). Key points reveal the following: 14 companies gave $116M to patient advocacy groups in 2015, compared to $63M in lobbying activities; 594 patient advocacy groups accepted money from pharma; and 15 patient advocacy
groups relied on pharma for at least 20% of yearly revenue. Id.

&

132. See Laura Karas et al., PharmaceuticalIndustry Funding to Patient-Advocacy Organization: A Cross-National Comparison of Disclosure Codes and Regulation, 42 HASTINGS INT'L
COMP. L. REV. 453, 453-456 (2019). "In general, the Sunshine Act requires applicable manufacturers of drugs, devices, biologicals, or medical supplies to report annually to the Secretary of HHS certain payments or other transfers of value to physicians and teaching hospitals." Thomas Sullivan, Physician Payment Sunshine Act Final Rule: Reporting Requirements,
POLICY & MEDICINE, https://www.policymed.com/2013/02/physician-payment-sunshineact-final-rule-reporting-requirements.html (last updated May 6, 2018).

133.

See Caroline Chen, IDA Repays Industry by Rushing Risky Drugs to the Market,

PROPUBLICA (Jun. 26, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/fda-repays-ind
ustry-by-rushing-risky-drugs-to-market; see also Susannah L. Rose, PatientAdvocacy Organizations: InstitutionalConflicts of Interest, Trust, and Trustworthiness, 41J L MED. ETHICS 680, 681-

82 (2013).
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ACCELERATION OF CLINICAL TRIALS, PRODUCT REVIEW,
AND APPROVAL

Many therapeutic biologics or drugs are developed to treat
serious or life-threatening diseases for which no other products are
available; they may also qualify for expedited development and review programs such as Fast Track designation, priority review, accelerated approval, Orphan Drug status, and breakthrough designation. "'
Fast Track designation is provided under the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act ("FDAMA") for a product that is
intended for the treatment of a serious or life-threatening condition and demonstrates the potential to address unmet medical
needs for such a condition.1 3 The applicant must apply for the Fast
Track designation when it submits the IND, or at any time prior to

the approval of the Biologics License Application ("BLA").136 The
benefits of receiving Fast Track designation include the availability
of meetings to seek FDA input into development plans, rolling submission where the BLA is submitted in sections as it becomes available rather than waiting for all sections to be submitted together at
the end, the use of surrogate endpoints, priority review, and accelerated approval. 137 The FDA may withdraw the designation if clinical development data shows that the product no longer meets the
criteria for the designation, as is the case when data shows that there
is no anticipated advantage over existing therapy, 138 for example.
Priority review and standard review are classifications that
the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research ("CDER") and Center
for Biologics Evaluation and Research ("CBER") use to prioritize
the review depending on the product's estimated therapeutic

134. See Jordan Paradise, Introduction to Biologics, in THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LIFE
SCIENCES LAW: DRUGS, DEVICES, AND BIOTECH, 71 (Kristian A. Werling et al. eds., 2nd ed.

2014).
135. 21 U.S.C. § 356; see also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., GUIDANCE
FOR
INDUSTRY:
FAST
TRACK
DRUG
DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMS-DESIGNATION,
DEVELOPMENT, AND APPLICATION REVIEW 1 (Jan. 2006) [hereinafter, GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: FAST TRACK DRUG DEVELOPMENT], http://www.msk.nclinnovations.org/medreg
ulations/v1/html/Guidance/GuidanceFast%20Track%2Development.pdf.
136.

GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: FAST TRACK DRUG DEVELOPMENT, supra note 135, at 8.

137.
138.

See id. at 10-15.
See id. at 9-10.
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value. 139 Priority review is given to a product that, if approved, will
bring significant improvement over marketed products. 140 Improvement can be demonstrated by: (1) evidence of increased effectiveness; (2) elimination or substantial reduction of a treatment-limiting drug reaction; (3) documented enhancement of patient
compliance; or (4) evidence of safety and effectiveness of a new subpopulation. 141 If not classified as priority review, the product will
receive standard review. Under FDAMA, a priority review sets the
target date for the FDA to complete all aspects of a review and make
the approval decision at six months after the filing date, while a
standard designation sets the target date at ten months. 142 Additionally, orphan drug status is assigned to drugs that treat rare diseases
or disorders impacting 200,000 people or less. 143 The status serves
as an incentive to research and innovate for treatments impacting
small populations; the FDA prioritizes review of such products using
the Priority Review program and also provides seven years of exclusivity for those that gain approval. 144
Accelerated approvals are available for drugs or biologics
that are indicated for serious or life-threatening illnesses and that
confer meaningful therapeutic benefits over existing treatments,
such as the ability to treat patients unresponsive to or intolerant of
available therapy, or improved patient response over available ther-

apy. 145 Under 21 C.F.R. § 601.41, the FDA may grant marketing approval for a biological product on the basis of adequate and wellcontrolled clinical trials which establish that the biological product
has an effect on a surrogate endpoint that is reasonably likely, based
on epidemiologic, therapeutic, pathophysiologic, or other evidence, to predict clinical benefit, or on the basis of an effect on a
clinical endpoint other than survival or irreversible morbidity. 146

139. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION, RESEARCH, AND REVIEW, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., MAPP 6020.3, REVIEW DESIGNATION POLICY: PRIORITY (P) AND STANDARD (S) 1-2

(2013), https://www.fda.gov/media/72723/download.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 6-7.
142. For further details, see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CBER, SOPP 8405: COMPLETE
REVIEW AND ISSUANCE OF ACTION LETTERS,
(2004), http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Proce-

duresSOPPs/ucm073481.htm (last visited June 1, 2013).
143. 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b) (10) ("Orphan drug means a drug intended for use in a rare
disease or condition as defined in section 526 of the act. .. ").

144.
145.
146.

See 21 C.F.R. §§ 316.3(b)(12), 316.31.
21 C.F.R § 314.500.
21 C.F.R. § 601.41.
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Products receiving accelerated approvals are subject to additional
postmarket studies to further evaluate the product and to verify its
clinical benefits, especially when there is uncertainty as to the relation of the surrogate endpoint to clinical benefit, or as to the relation of the observed clinical benefit to the ultimate outcome. 147
Finally, breakthrough designation was introduced by Congress in 2012 to add to these existing accelerated programs. 148 The
FDA defines a breakthrough therapy as a drug "intended alone or
in combination with one or more other drugs to treat a serious or
life threatening disease or condition and preliminary clinical evidence indicates that the drug may demonstrate substantial improvement over existing therapies on one or more clinically significant
endpoints, such as substantial treatment effects observed early in
clinical development." 149 Breakthrough therapy status signals that
the drug is progressing through clinical trials subject to the statutory provisions provided for breakthrough therapies, not that the
drug has been approved by the FDA.150
These routes of "faster" clinical trials, review, and approval
are utilized by the FDA frequently, either alone or in combination.15 1 While each route has its own designation and derives from
a specific grant of authority in the statute, they are all, collectively,
"accelerated" mechanisms. They are also associated with particular
incentives, including periods of product exclusivity and priority review vouchers to be redeemed either with a future product or sold
to another drug company for a hefty profit. 152 Recent empirical research suggests that the existence of these programs may be having
a negative impact on product quality and safety, as well as on public

147. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.510-314.560.
148. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012 (FDASIA), Pub.
L. No. 112-144, § 902, 126 Stat. 993, 1086-1087 (2012) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
356).
149. Fact Sheet: Breakthrough Therapies, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 28, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/Regulatorylnformation/LawsEnforcedbyFDA/SignificantAmend-

mentstotheFDCAct/FDASIA/ucm329491.htm.
150.

151.
152.

See GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: EXPEDITED PROGRAMS, supra note 125 at 10.
See id. at 1, 7.
See 21 C.F.R. §§ 316.3(b) (12), 316.31. Orphan drug status is accompanied by seven

years of market exclusivity, during which the FDA will not approve a generic version of that
drug. See id. Priority review vouchers are available both for rare tropical diseases and for
rare pediatric diseases. The GAO recently conducted a study on the impact of the PRV
See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG
DEVELOPMENT: FDA'S PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHER PROGRAMS 1, 2 (2020), https://

programs on drug development.
www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-251.
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perceptions of the FDA as a proper gatekeeper. 153 There is specific
concern that the impact behind the term "FDA Approved" is eroding.154

In aJanuary 2020 article, Darrow, Avorn, and Kesselheim explored FDA approval trends over the last four decades (1983-2018)
and concluded that "legislation and regulatory initiatives have substantially changed drug approval at the FDA." 155 Some of their statistics are particularly compelling. The number of new drug approvals that were supported by at least two pivotal clinical trials

decreased from 80.6% to 52.8% from 1995-1997 to 2015-2017,
while FDA drug review times decreased from over three years to less
than one year from 1983 to 2017.156 For new drugs, annual approval
rates varied, on average, from 34% between 1990-1999, 25% be-

tween 2000-2009, to 41% between 2010-2018.157 New approvals receiving orphan drug designation rose from 18% between 1984-

1995 to 41% between 2008-2018.158 In addition, the median number of generic drug approvals increased from 284 per year prior to
2012, to 488 per year between 2013-2018.159 Kesselheim and co-authors had previously reported that of 174 new drug approvals between January 2012 and December 2016, 60% were assigned to one
or more expedited programs, including 52% priority review, 36%
Fast Track, 17% breakthrough, and 15% accelerated approval. 160
They also reported that the median time from the application for
IND to FDA approval for drugs with at least one expedited route to
market was 0.9 years shorter than a drug without any such mechanism.161

153.

Linda Carroll, FDA Approval May Not be As Rigorous as it Once Was, REUTERS (Jan.

14, 2020, 5:42 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-fda/fda-approval-may-notbe-as-rigorous-as-it-once-was-idUSKBN1ZD2TC.

154. Id.
155. Jonathan J. Darrow et al., FDA Approval and Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, 19832018, 323 JAMA 164, 164 (2020). The Orphan Drug Act was enacted in 1983, followed by
Fast Track provisions (1987), Accelerated Approval (1992), Priority Review (1992), and
Breakthrough status (2012). See id. at 169, Box 2, for a helpful chronological chart of legis-

lation.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 164.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ThomasJ. Hwang et al., The FDA's Expedited Programsand ClinicalDevelopment Times

far Novel Therapeutics, 318 JAMA 2137, 2137 (2017).
161. Id. at 2138 (noting that the median development time decreased from 8 years to
7.1 years).
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Another study reports specifically on breakthrough therapy
designation following its introduction in the 2012 legislation.16 2 Be-

tween 2012-2017, the FDA approved 46 new drugs and biologics
with breakthrough status. 163 Of those 46 total products, 46 also received priority review, 30 received orphan drug status, 24 received
Fast Track status, and 18 underwent accelerated approval. 164 More
than half of the approvals were based on a single pivotal trial and
average premarket development times were less than five years. 161
The authors conclude that the findings suggest "pivotal trials supporting these approvals commonly lacked randomization, doubleblinding and control groups, used surrogate endpoints, and enrolled a small number of patients." 166 These accumulating statistics
suggest that accelerated routes to market are measurably impacting
the scope of clinical trials and FDA review times.
V.

EXTENSION OF CLINICAL TRIALS TO POSTMARKET

Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
in 2007 introduced new statutory provisions that bolster the FDA's
post-approval authority including Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategy authority and extension of clinical trials or limited studies
following product approval. 167 Prior to the legislative changes, the
FDA often imposed "phase 4" requirements on drug sponsors, including additional clinical trials or collection of specific data. 168
However, there were no corresponding penalties or enforcement
authority for violation of these requirements. Specifically, section
505(o) authorizes the FDA to require postmarket clinical trials for
any drug product. 169 Violations of the statute trigger civil money

162.

Jeremy Puthumana et al., Research Letter: Clinical Trial Evidence Supporting FDA Ap-

proval ofDrugs GrantedBreakthrough Therapy Designation, 320 JAMA 301 (2018).
163. Id. at 301. Another article notes that between 2012 and Dec. 2016, the FDA assigned breakthrough therapy designation to 165 investigational drugs. Hwang et al., supra

note 160, at 2138.
164.

Puthumana et al., supra note 162, at 302.

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a) (1).
168. How the FDA DrugApprovalProcess Works, DPAC (Feb. 20, 2018), http://www.diabetespac.org/fda-drug-approval-process.
169. 21 U.S.C. § 355(o) (3). The FDA has also issued final guidance on their authority
under there provisions. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY: POSTMARKETING STUDIES AND CLINICAL TRIALS - IMPLEMENTATION OF
SECTION 505(0)(3) OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 7 (Apr. 2011),

https://www.fda.gov/media/133746/download.
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penalties and subject manufacturers to litigation under misbranding provisions within the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 170 Civil
money penalties are capped at $250,000 per violation and cannot
exceed $1 million for all violations in a single proceeding. 171 Where
a violation continues after the agency provides written notice, the
civil penalty is:

$250,000 for the first 30-day period (or any portion thereof) that the responsible person continues to be in violation, and such amount shall
double for every 30-day period thereafter that
the
violation
continues,
not to
exceed
$1,000,000 for any 30-day period, and not to ex-

ceed $10,000,000 for all such violations adjudicated in a single proceeding.

17 2

The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services is instructed to consider whether the responsible person is
making efforts to correct the violations when determining the
amount of civil penalty. 173
A search of the FDA website reporting on these postmarket
requirements and commitments issued under Section 505(o) (3)
identifies 502 such requirements imposed by both the Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research ("CDER") and the Center for Biologic Evaluation and Research since the passing of the legislation in
2007.174 As noted in the approval letter for Sarepta Therapeutics'
new drug product Exondys-51 (eteplirsen), the FDA expressly states
in the documentation of approval when they are exercising this authority:
Section 505(o) (3) of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) authorizes FDA to require holders of approved drug and biological
product applications to conduct postmarketing
studies and clinical trials for certain purposes, if

170.
171.
172.
173.

21
21
21
21

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§ 333(b).
§ 333(b).
§ 333(f) (4) (A) (ii).
§ 333(f) (4) (B).

174. Postmarket Requirements and Commitments, U.S.
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/pmc/index.cfm

2020).
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FDA makes certain findings required by the statute. 175
The FDA approved Exondys-51 (eteplirsen), the first treatment for Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy ("DMD"), in September
2016 after prolonged disputes within the agency. 176 DMD is a severe
form of muscular dystrophy associated with progressive muscle
weakness and loss, manifesting in males between the ages of three

and five. 177 DMD effects 1 in 3,500 boys in the U.S., classifying it as
a rare, or Orphan, disease under the statute. The Director of the
CDER, Dr. Janet Woodcock, ultimately approved the product despite advisory board recommendations. 178 The decision was controversial, as FDA staff and advisory committee members had urged
that the drug had not been shown to be effective in clinical trials
consisting of only twelve patients, with no placebo control group. 179
In an uncommon move, then-FDA Commissioner Robert Califf issued a public memo defending Dr. Woodcock's decision.180
The drug's approval was coupled with robust postmarket
trial requirements imposed on Sarepta Therapeutics to further
measure carcinogenicity in animals with required reporting deadlines looming in Fall 2020.181 In addition to 505(o) (3) requirements
for postmarket studies, Exondys-51 was also granted accelerated approval, Fast Track, Priority review, and Orphan Drug status along
with a rare pediatric priority review voucher. 182 The drug costs approximately $300,000 a year and will treat approximately 13% of

175.

Letter from Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Re-

search, to Sarepta Therapeutics, Inc. (Sept. 19, 2016) (on file with Food & Drug Admin.).

176. Sy Mukherjee, The FDA Just Made Its Most ControversialDrug Approval of the Year,
FORTUNE (Sept. 19, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/19/fda-drug-approval-exondys51.
177.

W. Douglas Biggar, Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy, 27 PEDIATRICS IN REV. 83, 84

(2006).
178. Jeff Buchanan, Bio Execs Talk Patient Advocacy, Duchenne Approval at BioFonrard
Panel, EXOME (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.xconomy.com/wisconsin/2016/09/28/bio-execs-talk-patient-advocacy-duchenne-approval-at-bioforward-panel.

179.

See Robert Weisman, FDA Approves Sarepta's Disputed Drug, OverrulingStaffers and

Advisors, Bos. GLOBE (Sept. 19, 2016, 5:23 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/09/ 19/fda-approves-duchenne-drug-overturning-staff-and-advisers/mKVY1HQ0Fn1Mcs2WJQWS0J/story.html.
180.

Mukherjee, supra note 176.

181.

Weisman, supra note 179.
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Letter from Woodcock, M.D. to Sarepta Therapeutics, supra note 175.
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patients with a specific mutation associated with DMD. 183 The debate and review of the drug was informed by intense patient participation. Public meetings in April 2016 were attended by hundreds
of patient advocates. 184 Reporters described the meetings as "emotionally charged" when young, wheelchair-bound patients described living with the disease and the need for treatment. 185 Notably, the FDA expanded public discussion from sixty minutes to 2.5
hours. 186
In a stunningly similar manner, the FDA recently approved
Vyondys-53, a second DMD drug from Sarepta, in December
2019.187 Again, FDA staff and experts originally recommended
against approval, but Sarepta filed an appeal and resubmitted their
new drug application. 188 Vyondys-53 is approved to treat the 8% of
patients with a second genetic mutation. 189 The product was
granted accelerated approval, Priority review, and Orphan Drug status and received a rare pediatric review voucher. 190 The FDA likewise required a slate of postmarket studies to verify clinical benefit,
carcinogenicity, and immune response related to kidney side effects. 191 Testing to support such studies must be completed by 2024,
during which time the drug may enter the market conditionally. 192
Sarepta indicates that its cost will be on par with Exondys-51, at
about $300,000 per month. 193

183.

Weisman, supra note 179. The cost breaks down to $1,680 for 2 milliliters.

184.

Robert Weisman, Muscular Dystrophy Drug Advocates Plan to Pack Crucial Meeting,

Bos. GLOBE (Apr. 18, 2016, 7:30 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/
04/18/drug-advocates-plan-pack-crucial-meeting/OMb3xupTONfQm61 CmDptTM/story
.html.
185.

Weisman, supra note 179.

186. Natalie Grover, Sarepta sharessink as IDA staffstay sour on muscle drug, REUTERS (Apr.
21, 2016, 7:55 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sarepta-fda/sarepta-shares-sink-asfda-staff-stay-sour-on-muscle-drug-idUSKCN0XI1MO.
187. Letter from Bill Dunn, M.D., Acting Director, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, to Sarepta Therapeutics, Inc. (Dec. 12, 2019) (on file with Food & Drug Amin.)
[hereinafter Letterfrom Bill Dunn, M.D. to Sarepta Therapeutics].
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Duchenne Drug It Rejected, BIOPHARMADIVE (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/fda-surprise-approval-sarepta-vyondys-53-duchenne-drug/569015.
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"FASTER" FORWARD

As a result of Congressional action through legislation, and
agency policy and regulation, patients are getting earlier access to
drug products through a variety of mechanisms. Whether this access is through FDA expanded access or the RTT Act, one or several
of the accelerated mechanisms of review and approval, or extension
of clinical trials into the postmarket space to accommodate for collection of safety and efficacy information following product approval, the timeline for any given product may be "faster" than the
framework Congress set forth in the Kefauver-Harris Act in 1962.194
The question becomes whether this seeming erosion of the historical framings of safety and efficacy has implications for patient
health and product safety going forward. In the abstract, it is difficult to determine whether "faster" is introducing any challenges or
tensions on those fronts and whether there may be a tipping point;
after all, the FDA's enduring conflict is the split mission in its enabling act to both protect the public health and to speed innovations.
However, several issues warrant prospective attention as the FDA
continues to utilize these mechanisms to speed up access and implement recent legislative directives to expand patient input in the
regulatory process. This article identifies a few of these issues and
reserves careful analysis to future scholarship.
First, as the scope of "substantial evidence" of "adequate and
well-controlled studies" changes and the sources of information
supporting review and approval expands, how useful and usable will
patient experience data and real-world evidence be? What mechanisms can the FDA implement to verify experiences from an objective standpoint? And, ultimately, how will consumers and physicians
understand and utilize this information if offered publicly with FDA
approval decisions?
Second, what are the measurable impacts of increasing use
of accelerated approval mechanisms, with the FDA often designating several mechanisms together to speed up both the timeframe
for completion of clinical trials and the eventual FDA review time?
Certainly, there must be implications of "faster" for patient safety
with products being approved based on less data. A growing scholarship is exploring these issues, though more work needs to be

194. AGATA DABROWSKA & SUSAN THAUL, How FDA APPROVES DRUGS AND REGULATES
THEIR SAFETY AND EFFECTIVNESS, FAS 1-2 (May 8, 2018), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/

misc/R41983.pdf.
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done. 195 In order to collect and analyze this accumulating data,
there must be transparent reporting mechanisms and databases to
aggregate the information. Are current reporting procedures, public availability of these reports, and scrutiny and analysis of the postmarket information by the FDA satisfactory? In addition, with the
increasing use of 505(o) to require studies of aspects of concern to
the FDA to be completed following a conditional approval, are important pre-market safety efficacy measures being relegated to a
later time, after market? And how does the FDA feed the data and
results from those studies back into the regulatory process? For example, has there been a resulting increase in withdrawals of approvals or indications resulting from those 505(o) studies?
Third, there are also informational gaps about the operation
of faster routes to market and what it means about the level of clinical trials and premarket testing associate with the product. As
noted explicitly by the FDA, "[b]ecause each of these approaches
implies speed, there can be confusion about the specific meaning
of each and the distinctions among them." 196 Scholarship documents these misconceptions and misunderstandings on behalf of
both patients and physicians.197 Physicians, patients, and drug sponsors are also questioning the difference between the right to try process versus expanded use. How do we address this widespread misunderstanding, particularly by prescribers who serve as learned
intermediaries? Are there particular educational modes and outlets
or labeling approaches for approved products to inform relevant
stakeholders?
Finally, tied directly to the pervasive problem of soaring
drug prices, there are also questions about how these mechanisms
are impacting effective patent life and the carefully-balanced calculus of patent term extension. 198 Some scholarship suggests that a
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See, e.g., Puthumana et al., supra note 162; Hwang et al., supra note 160; Caroline

Chen, FDA IncreasinglyApproves Drugs without Conclusive Proof They Work, PBS NEWS HOUR
(June 26, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/fda-increasingly-approves-drugswithout-conclusive-proof-they-work.
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status such as Fast Track diminishes patent life and serves as a disadvantage to the longevity of a product. 199 On the other hand, other
sources indicate that less review and approval time available may
translate into longer effective patent life and increased opportunities for monopolistic behavior by the industry. The relationship between recent trends for "faster" access and patent implications is
ripe for focused scrutiny.
In conclusion, the RTT Act suffers from both structural and
implementation problems and is unlikely to upend successful,
longstanding FDA expanded access procedures. As a result of Congressional directives and FDA policy over the last several decades,
there are various other mechanisms for "faster" access to investigational products, each raising their own collective questions about
product safety and efficacy. While the value of these "faster" mechanisms cannot be overstated, there is also reason to continue to assess outcomes and implications.
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FDLI UPDATE 43, 43 (2009).

